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Abstract
Deep learning methods are widely regarded as indispens-
able when it comes to designing perception pipelines for
autonomous agents such as robots, drones or automated
vehicles. The main reasons, however, for deep learning
not being used for autonomous agents at large scale al-
ready are safety concerns. Deep learning approaches typ-
ically exhibit a black-box behavior which makes it hard
for them to be evaluated with respect to safety-critical as-
pects. While there have been some work on safety in deep
learning, most papers typically focus on high-level safety
concerns. In this work, we seek to dive into the safety
concerns of deep learning methods and present a concise
enumeration on a deeply technical level. Additionally,
we present extensive discussions on possible mitigation
methods and give an outlook regarding what mitigation
methods are still missing in order to facilitate an argu-
mentation for the safety of a deep learning method.
1 Introduction
During the last years new and exciting applications were
enabled by machine learning (ML) and especially, by
deep learning (DL) methods. Their capability of solv-
ing problems which cannot be fully specified makes DL a
key enabler in many applications. Therefore, DL is also
of fundamental importance for the fast growing field of
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and Auto-
mated Driving (AD) as it is not possible to specify an open
context in every detail (e.g., the data representation of a
pedestrian in all varieties cannot be specified such that it
could always be recognized by a rule-based algorithm).
Different from humans, current DL algorithms do not
learn semantic or causal relationships but simply corre-
lations in data they are presented with. For example, a
DL algorithm used for detecting objects in camera im-
ages learns correlations between the pixels of the image
and object representations, e.g., bounding boxes. While
DL algorithms provide state-of-the-art performance, it is
more difficult to understand how they arrive at their pre-
dictions. This poses a problem when releasing systems
that incorporate DL methods from a safety point of view.
While safety related aspects in the automotive area
are usually handled through approaches defined in the
ISO 26262 [1], the usage of DL methods introduces a
number of additional safety-related aspects not covered in
the aforementioned norm. Most notably, DL algorithms
may predict incorrect results, e.g., an object detection al-
gorithm may miss to predict an existing object. These
kinds of limitations are not covered in the ISO 26262
but rather in the recently published ISO PAS 21448
also known as the Safety of the Intended Functionality
(SOTIF) [2].
According to this standard, SOTIF is the absence of un-
reasonable risk due to hazards resulting from functional
insufficiencies of the intended functionality. A prerequi-
site for achieving SOTIF is a proper understanding of the
system, its limitations as well as the conditionswhich may
unveil these limitations. This is a difficult task for sys-
tems incorporating DL components because the learning
process of DL algorithms is entirely different from that of
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a human being. Humans intuitively analyze systems and
their weaknesses on a semantic level, e.g., interpreting a
difficult scene as a composition of things like lightning
conditions, type and position of objects, behavior of ac-
tors, etc. However, in DL the problem space shifts from
a semantic level to the level of data representations (e.g.,
pixel values of an image). Thus, DL-specific insufficien-
cies and failure causes are not necessarily intuitive for hu-
mans, making it difficult to understand such methods and
their limitations. Hence, arguing the safety of a system
that relies on the correctness of DL outputs requires a ded-
icated safety consideration of such algorithms.
In this paper, we give a concise overview of safety con-
cerns and their underlying problems regarding the use
of DL algorithms focusing on Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs)1. In particular, we will consider DNNs used in
the perception pipeline of an ADAS or AD system. Typ-
ical use cases for such components are DNN-based ob-
ject detection or semantic segmentation of the input data.
The information obtained from these DNN-components
are then further used in an ADAS or AD system which
may incorporate additional information such as parallel
sensing paths or post processing of the DNN’s output. The
goal of the system is to enable one or multiple functions,
e.g., an automated emergency brake or a highway pilot.
Furthermore, we present potential mitigation approaches
along with a deep technical discussion.
2 Related Work
The question how one can use ML in safety-critical tasks
and especially highly automated driving has attracted a
considerable amount of research over the last years (e.g.,
[3]–[11]). As discussed in the previous section, existing
automotive standards such as ISO 26262 do not address
the unique characteristics of data-driven approaches used
in an open context.
As pointed out in [8], currently, there exists no agreed-
upon way to verify and validate ML components used in
ADAS or AD systems. In particular, the foundational sta-
tistical ML principles of empirical risk minimization and
average losses are not fully applicable when considering
1Please note that while we focus on DNNs, a large amount of the
safety concerns discussed in this paper may also be valid for other types
of ML-based methods.
safety, as discussed in [5]. However, several works exist
which define requirements or safety criteria such a com-
ponent needs to fulfill.
In [3], the authors derive safety criteria for neural net-
works from an abstract top-level goal. Thereby, the posed
goals and criteria are on a purely functional level outlined
in a Goal Structuring Notation (GSN). Following this line
of work, Burton et al. [6] and Gauerhof et al. [11] propose
a systematic approach using GSN in order to argue the
safety of ML-based components. In contrast to Kurd et
al. [3], they put the focus already more on the specific is-
sues of ML models. In their work, they formulate require-
ments for an ML model derived from the discussed safety
concerns. Furthermore, they discuss potential sources of
evidences for the constructed assurance case.
In a further work, Burton et al. [9] propose an approach
for constructing an argumentation for the safety of an ML
model which they term performance evidence confidence.
The approach is based on a design-by-contract principle
of the safety argumentation which in turn uses safety con-
tracts. These safety contracts provide certain guarantees
if a defined set of assumptions hold.
Another work that deals with this topic is given by
Adler et al. [10]. Here, the authors extract areas of ac-
tivity by a systematic literature search. Based on this,
challenges regarding the use of DNNs in safety critical
applications are listed and methods which might help to
overcome them are mapped. However, the validity of the
list as well as the effectiveness of the mapped methods
remains to be shown.
In this work, we seek to expand the discussion about
safety concerns with regard to the usage of DNNs in
safety-critical perception tasks. Furthermore, we con-
cretize these concerns including root causes and discuss
potentials as well as limitations of possible mitigation ap-
proaches.
3 Definitions
Before going into the details of safety concerns, we first
give definitions for the most crucial terms used in this pa-
per.
A Deep Neural Network (DNN) is a machine learning
model which is made up of layers. The layers may be
either connected in a feedforward or recurrent fashion.
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Each layer takes some form of data as input, processes
it, applies a so-called activation function and then outputs
the result. This output may in turn be used by other layers
as input. The output of the final layer is used as the predic-
tion of the DNN. In most use-cases arising for DNNs in
the context of highly automated driving, the DNN is asked
to predict a conditional probability p(Y = y |X = x). In
other words, the DNN is tasked to predict the posterior
probability for a dependent random variable Y (e.g., class
probabilities) based on the independent random variable
X (e.g., input images). For this, one needs to specify the
expected type of distribution of Y . This is important as
the DNN needs to be equipped with a so-called link func-
tion which maps to the correct range of Y . If, for exam-
ple, one wants to perform classification with the DNN,
Y is typically expected to follow a multinomial distribu-
tion. In this case, the link function of choice is the well-
known softmax. As X and Y are unknown, the typical
approach for obtaining a good DNN model is to record
a dataset D = {(xi, yi)}
N
i=1
with realizations of X and
Y and performmaximum-likelihood estimation of the pa-
rameters with respect to the data. Here, xi is a data sam-
ple (e.g., camera image) and yi the corresponding annota-
tion(s) (e.g., bounding boxes of objects to be detected). In
practice, optimization is typically achieved by minimiz-
ing the value of the negative log-likelihood function using
(stochastic) gradient descent. The negative log-likelihood
function is commonly referred to as loss function in this
case.
According to ISO PAS 21448, functional insufficien-
cies are insufficiencies inherent in the system possibly
leading to hazards. Such an insufficiency can appear, e.g.,
in form of a performance limitation leading to an incom-
plete or wrong perception of the environment. A func-
tional insufficiency can be unveiled under some condi-
tions. A set of such conditions is referred to as a trig-
gering event. In particular, considering a DNN module in
the perception pipeline of an ADAS or AD system, such
an event can provoke an erroneous output (see Figure 1)
possibly causing a hazardous behavior of the system.
4 Safety Concerns
We define safety concerns (SCs) (or simply concerns) as
underlying issues which may negatively affect the safety
Triggering event
+
Functional
Insufficiencies
Safety
Concerns
Error
Figure 1: The relation between safety concerns, func-
tional insufficiencies, triggering event, and error. Con-
cerns potentially lead to insufficiencies inherent in the
function. Together with a triggering event, a functional
insufficiency provoke an erroneous output of the function.
of a system. They are either the direct root of a functional
insufficiency or describe a black-box-like characteristic of
the system which in turn makes it hard to assess safety.
Safety concerns are usually tied to subcomponents of the
system. In particular, there exist specific concerns when
deploying a DL algorithm in an ADAS or AD vehicle.
The concerns which turn into functional insufficiencies
originate from the inherent design of DL methods. In gen-
eral, a supervised DL algorithm tries to extract the joint
probability distribution p(X,Y ) [12]. As the distribution
is inherently unknown, the only option is to approximate
it through a dataset D and extract the characteristics of
the distribution from the dataset. The algorithm produces
incorrect results, if its approximation of the underlying
distribution p is not good enough at a given data point.
The concerns relating to black-box-characteristics orig-
inate from DL-specific properties. DL algorithms usu-
ally project the input data into high-dimensional spaces
which cannot be entirely interpreted by a human anymore.
While it is, for example, well known that classification-
based DL methods partition their input space into non-
convex subspaces, giving semantic meaning to these sub-
spaces is largely impossible.
In the following, we will describe the safety concerns
of DL algorithms in an AD perception pipeline in detail.
Data distribution is not a good approximation of
real world (SC-1) The first overarching concern is that
the distribution of the data used in development might
not be a good approximation to the one of the real
open world which is a priori unknown. As mentioned
before, the distribution meant here is on the level of
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data representations, which are high-dimensional and
non-intuitive. Therefore, we can only approach them
from (or estimate them on) a semantic level by analyzing
influencing factors such as daylight, object appearance
and weather conditions. This is prone to incompleteness
since not all aspects important for the data representation
may be covered this way. Besides, the data collection
can have other shortcomings which are independent of
the level at which it is represented. Examples of such
problems are bias (e.g. over- or under-representation
of certain factors) or disregarding effects related to
different physical deployments (e.g. varying sensor
position and angle due to different system variants or
manufacturing tolerances). Training and testing a DNN
with data which do not sufficiently approximate the Op-
erational Design Domain (ODD) will very likely lead to
an insufficient performance or robustness later in the field.
Distributional shift over time (SC-2) A DNN is
trained and tested at a certain point in time, e.g., during
development. However, our world is changing continu-
ously. This means that even if we would train a “perfect”
algorithm, the probability distribution of the input data
will change over time (e.g., new vehicles with a different
appearance will be released). Since such a change will
occur naturally, this concern needs to be addressed by
appropriate measures being effective over the product’s
lifetime.
Incomprehensible behavior (SC-3) One of the main
difficulties in arguing the safety of DNNs is our inability
to explain exactly how they come to a decision. In
other words, the non-linearity and complexity of DNNs
is a double-edged sword; on the one hand, it enables
them to automatically extract features and relate those
to outputs via non-linear activation functions, which, in
turn, makes them so suitable for solving non-specifiable
problems. On the other hand, those features and their
connection to the outputs are rather counterintuitive and
incomprehensible for us. Therefore, unlike in the case
of rule-based functions, it is hardly possible to derive
a causal relation between the data representation and
predictions of the network. Consequently, identifying
weaknesses and failure causes of DNNs is difficult
and sometimes infeasible, impeding the applicability
of common safety engineering methods (e.g., fault tree
analysis, common cause analysis, etc.).
Unknown behavior in rare critical situations (SC-4)
This concern is directly related to the well-known long-
tail problem in the context of AD. The long-tail problem
describes the fact that there exists an enormous amount of
scenarios that have a low occurrence probability. These
scenarios may however be safety-critical. If one wants
to test them, it would require a practically impossible
amount of driving hours to capture them by chance.
Regarding this issue, two important aspects need to be
mentioned: first, note that according to the statistical
learning theory, the performance of an ML algorithm
evaluated on a test data set can only be generalized if
test data, training data and the data which the function
is facing later in the open world are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples out of the same
probability distribution [12]. Thus, it might be prob-
lematic to artificially insert such scenarios in the test
data used to estimate the generalization capability of
DNN’s performance. Second, even though one could
define a separate dataset in order to test the function
with respect to such data, it is hardly possible to identify
a rare critical situation from the perspective of a DNN
a priori. This is due to the fact that DNNs do not
look at semantic content but rather the data itself (see
section 1). This makes it very difficult to define appropri-
ate test cases in advance in order to deal with this concern.
Unreliable confidence information (SC-5) In prac-
tice, DNNs will be faced with input data for which they
cannot make an accurate prediction. This may either
stem from an insufficient amount or representativeness
of training data or an inherent uncertainty in the data
itself (e.g., motion blur). Ideally, the DNN should
reliably indicate if its prediction can be trusted or not.
This behavior would allow for a number of established
safety approaches to be used for a DNN component
such as giving more weight to parallel information paths,
initiating an emergency maneuver or a driver handover.
Most DNN algorithms used in practice output some form
of posterior probability (e.g., class probabilities in case
of a classifier) and one may be tempted to use the value
of the highest probability or the information entropy as
a measure of confidence. This may, however, be highly
critical if the probabilities are not well calibrated. In par-
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ticular, it has been shown that DNNs using the standard
multinomial cross entropy loss in combination with the
softmax as link function tend to be overconfident in their
predictions [13]. Even worse, it can be shown that if these
DNNs use Rectified Linear Units (ReLUs) as activation
functions they can produce arbitrarily high posterior
probabilities when dealing with data far away from the
training data [14]. While confidence information may
not benefit the solution of the problem itself, it serves
as a vital enabler of a safety argument in a respective
safety case. For example, well calibrated confidence
information may be used in a multi-sensor system to fuse
concurrent predictions from different sensors.
Brittleness of DNNs (SC-6) As shown by many
works, the brittleness of DNNs is a major safety con-
cern. This includes the robustness against common
perturbations such as noise or certain weather conditions,
e.g. [15], and translations/rotations, e.g. [16], as well as
targeted perturbations known as adversarial examples,
e.g. [17], [18]. Note that regarding adversarial examples,
the so-called adversarial patches are of special interest
in the context of ADAS and AD (e.g., [19]–[21]). This
is due to the fact that a would-be attacker can simply
change the operation environment of a vehicle instead of
having to hack into the vehicle itself. Physical adversarial
patch-based attacks do thus scale considerably better than
those based on overlaying the raw sensor data recorded
in a vehicle with noise.
Inadequate separation of test and training data
(SC-7) Another concern is that test data might be in-
adequately separated from training data. For training
and testing DNNs, the data is usually divided into
training, validation and test datasets. In order not to
overestimate the DNN’s performance, the test dataset
needs to be (sufficiently) uncorrelated to the other ones.
However, in practice, highly correlated data is usually
acquired because, e.g., data is recorded in sequences (i.e.
consecutive frames are rather similar) or data is recorded
at the same locations several times. Another aspect is
that developers tend to optimize on test datasets during
training because they strive for the maximum perfor-
mance which is measured on this test data. Therefore, a
training process is continued until performance goals of
a network are met on the test dataset. Good and labeled
data is expensive and thus, rare in practice, but using a
test dataset several times means also an optimization with
respect to the test data leading to an overestimation of a
DNN’s performance.
Dependence on labeling quality (SC-8) In the case
of supervised learning, labeled datasets are required for
training and testing a DNN. Notice that the labeling,
which is typically done manually, and its quality directly
affect the resulting function and therefore, the obtained
test results as shown, e.g., in [22]. In particular, if the
label quality is not sufficient, the results obtained during
testing may be misleading. As a result, the function could
have an insufficient performance later in the field. Hence,
the labeling quality needs to be ensured in order to argue
the safety of such a learning function.
Insufficient consideration of safety in metrics (SC-9)
Using state-of-the-art metrics such as mean average
precision and false positive/negative rate, only the av-
erage performance of DNNs is evaluated. Additionally,
when assessing the performance of a DNN, typically
all elements of a test dataset influence the performance
metric. There may, however, be elements which the DNN
predicted incorrectly but would not impact the system
itself. For example, consider the case of a DNN used
for pedestrian detection which serves the function of
an automated emergency brake. If the car is driving at
30 kph and fails to detect a pedestrian at 500m distance,
this will in all likelihood not have an impact on the
safety of the system. However, in common metrics, such
a person will be counted in the same way as a person
standing directly in front of the car. This will inevitably
lead to giving the DNN a worse safety rating than is
actually the case.
5 Potential Mitigation Approaches
Releasing an ADAS or AD system requires a comprehen-
sive argumentation to show that all concerns related to the
system’s safety are identified, understood and mitigated.
After having discussed the safety concerns regarding the
use of DNNs within such systems in section 4, we present
several promising mitigation approaches (MAs) which
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could be used in order to provide supporting arguments
and evidences for a safety case.
Well-justified data acquisition strategy (MA-1)
The basis for testing ML functions is an appropriate
dataset reflecting the context in which the function is
supposed to work. In particular, one needs to argue
that the dataset used is a suitable representation of the
data which the DNN will be faced within the ODD. As
pointed out before, the distribution which is relevant here
is on the level of the data representations (e.g., pixel-level
distribution). Finding suitable random samples from
this distribution is - in most cases - highly non-trivial,
mainly due to the dimensionality of the data. Thus, we
propose to follow a two-step approach here. The first
step is to specify the data content, as well as the data
acquisition and selection process, in a structured and
thorough manner. For this, essential ODD factors such as
weather conditions, road types, occurring objects as well
as their variations in the ODD need to be determined,
see e.g., [23]. Additional factors such as tolerances in
the mounting positions of the sensors and predictable
changes over the product’s lifetime (e.g. sensor aging)
should be considered as well. Finally, the existence of
specified variations and their frequencies in the acquired
data need to be verified.
The aforementioned analysis happens on a semantic
level and may not fully cover the specifics of the data at
hand (e.g., certain biases in the pixel distribution of an
image). Thus, the second step is to analyze the raw data
and find suitable datapoints which are missing from the
first step. This can, for example, be achieved by finding
a latent representation of the data using a variational
autoencoder and sampling the latent space in a suitable
manner.
Enabling the output of reliable confidence infor-
mation (MA-2) As explained before, the posterior
probability predicted by a DNN tends to be overconfident
even for inputs close to the training data [13] and may be
arbitrarily high when moving away from the training data
[14]. In order to be able to output reliable confidence
information, a number of approaches have been proposed.
In [13] a number of heuristic approaches are evaluated,
which either make use of the logit or posterior probability
outputs in order to calibrate the output probabilities and
in turn allow them to be used as a reliable measure of
confidence.
Besides heuristics, other approaches have made use of
Bayesian methods in order to extract uncertainties. In [24]
the authors use dropout during inference which turns their
neural network into a Bayesian model with the weights
being represented by Bernoulli distributions. They show
that when dropout is used at inference time, one approx-
imately marginalizes over the weights of the neural net-
work using Monte Carlo integration. This approach is
hence termed Monte Carlo Dropout. Another Bayesian
approach is presented by Blundell et al. [25]. Here,
the authors model the weights of the neural network us-
ing Gaussian distributions and minimize the ELBO loss.
They achieve this using also Monte Carlo integration to
approximately marginalize over the weights of the neural
network.
Besides the actual method itself, it is still an open
question how one can determine if a measure of confi-
dence is reliable or not in the context of AD. In [26] the
use of expected calibration error (ECE) and maximum
calibration error (MCE) is proposed. Both metrics
operate on the probabilities predicted from the neural
network. First, the maximum posterior probability is
quantized into a desired number of bins for a test dataset.
Then, the accuracy is computed for each. Generally,
the outputs are well-calibrated if the accuracy of each
bin is equal to the average probability in this bin. The
difference in these two values is called calibration error.
While for ECE the calibration error is averaged over all
bins, MCE simply returns the largest calibration error.
However, a main drawback of both ECE and MCE is that
both metrics depend on a parameter, namely the number
of bins. This parameter heavily influences the obtained
result.
Using gray-box methods (MA-3). A major imped-
iment to the safety argumentation of DNNs is their
black-box character SC-3. Even though turning the
black-box to a white-box will be scarcely possible in the
foreseeable future, several methods were introduced re-
cently to gain understanding of the root causes for DNN’s
predictions by visualizing decisive parts of the input (e.g.,
gradient-weighted class activation mapping [27]) or by
forcing the DNN to provide more interpretable outputs
(e.g., object attributes [28]). While these methods cannot
6
enable an analytical safety evaluation, they still can
contribute to a safety case, e.g., by making the analysis
of a test result more meaningful or by supporting the
extraction of uncertainties for DNN’s prediction (e.g., by
analyzing the distribution of decisive parts of an image
with respect to certain object classes). Note that the
trustworthiness of such methods needs to be shown which
is indeed a non-trivial task as well.
Specification of adversarial threat models and in-
corporation of defense methods (MA-4) Before being
able to defend against adversarial examples, one must
first determine a threat model, which in essence repre-
sents an assumption on what a possible attacker is capable
to perform as an attack. Most of the current work in
adversarial examples focuses on data-level threat models,
meaning that an attacker is allowed to change the values
of a given datum. For example, in computer vision-based
problems this is typically achieved by changing the
values of pixels in an image at arbitrary locations. This
kind of threat model typically involves some form of
budget that may not be exceeded, e.g., the difference in
pixel values between an original image and an adversarial
example may not exceed a certain amount, oftentimes
measured in either l2 or l∞ norm (e.g., [18], [29],
[30]). Other data-level threat models include adversarial
patches [31] or affine transformation-based attacks [32].
Of course, allowing data-level changes may oftentimes
be an unrealistic or highly improbable threat model. For
example, in the case of autonomous vehicles, an attacker
would need access to the pixel buffer in order to alter
pixel values. This form of attack does not scale well and
is thus probably a neglectable threat model. However,
there exist a number of techniques, which are known as
physical adversarial examples, that do scale well. Here,
the environment in which a datum is recorded is altered
instead of the datum itself. Common techniques for this
include sticker-based attacks which can either be applied
to objects in the environment (e.g., [19], [21], [33]) or
be used to partially occlude the sensor which is used for
recording the data (e.g., [34]).
There exist many other threat models which have not
been listed so far2. In general, there exists no model which
may be assumed by default. In the future, there might be
2For a concise overview of common threat models see, e.g., [35].
standards and norms which define an appropriate model
for a given domain (e.g., physical based attacks for AD).
However, in the meantime the choice of threat model must
be made on a per-case basis and argued accordingly.
Having chosen and argued for a specific threat model,
one has to deploy defense mechanisms which protect
against falling victim to adversarial examples. The main
problem with most known defense mechanisms is that
they may have given good results initially but were
quickly exposed after having been published. This has
been the fate of distillation-based defenses [36] (exposed
in [37]), defenses based on transforming the input such as
JPEG compression [38] (exposed in [39]) and gradient-
obfuscation methods [40] (exposed in [39]). As of writ-
ing this paper, there only exist two approaches for defend-
ing against adversarial examples, which are effective to at
least a certain degree and are somewhat accepted in the
ML community3. First, there is an empirical approach
known as adversarial training with PGD adversaries [29].
This method tries to optimize a DNN to predict the cor-
rect class for a given sample’s strongest adversarial ex-
ample. While this approach is not able to guarantee that it
actually finds the strongest adversary under a given threat
model, it is very flexible with respect to the model actually
used. For example, the commonly used bounded pixel-
level threat model can be easily replaced by other models
such as rotation- or sticker-based attacks. The second ap-
proach uses a convex outer approximation of reachable
activations of the ReLU units of a neural network to de-
fend against adversarial examples [41]. This method can
give guaranteed lower bounds on the loss values of adver-
sarial examples. A drawback of this analytic method is
that the training procedure takes considerably longer than
standard SGD training4.
Beside making the network itself more robust, other
approaches aim at detecting adversarial attacks, e.g.,
by using a trained subnetwork [30]. Even though the
DNN would still be fooled by the attack in this case, the
information that the DNN’s prediction is not trustworthy
at this moment could trigger an appropriate system reac-
tion preventing harm. However, such a detector-network
could be attacked as well which means that its robustness
3Defending against adversarial examples is currently a heavily re-
searched topic and there may exist other effective methods.
4There have been improvements in the training time of this method
in order to scale to larger datasets, see [42].
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needs to be argumented too.
Testing (MA-5) Naturally, a key component of a
safety argumentation is testing usually including verifi-
cation and validation activities. While verification rather
addresses issues which are already known or foreseeable
(e.g., lack of robustness against certain perturbations),
validation focuses on identifying unknown issues. In the
following, we will refer to mitigation approaches that
address these issues as MA-5a and MA-5b respectively.
MA-5a: Known or predictable critical cases can be as-
sessed via targeted testing. This approach supports miti-
gating SC-1, SC-4 and SC-6. The selection of test data is
key for a thorough analysis of DNNs. One of the meth-
ods for identifying targeted test cases is HAZOP (Haz-
ard&Operability, [43]). It is a standard safety procedure
used to systematically identify malfunctions and risks of
a complex system. In [44], the authors adapt HAZOP to
computer vision systems and provide a catalog containing
an extensive set of known critical situations for computer
vision tasks as a basis for assessing the quality and thor-
oughness of test data. Of special interest is the stability of
DL algorithms with respect to certain effects in the input
space (e.g. blur, windscreen smudges or exposure related
effects). As highlighted by Zendel et al. [45], the evalua-
tion of robustness requires a targeted addition of difficult
samples into a test dataset. A benchmark for robustness
against known corruptions and perturbations is introduced
in [15]. Another approach for effectively testing DNN
algorithms is search-based-testing [46]. This technique
aims at exploring the input space in a targeted manner en-
abling, e.g., a sensitivity analysis with respect to certain
ODD factors or different combinations of them. Note that
while some of the approaches mentioned can make use of
real data (recorded on public roads or test tracks) others
require artificially generated data. Thus, it is important
to mention that for obtaining reliable test results on syn-
thetic data, the validity of this data with respect to real
data has to be shown. This is, in turn, a highly non-trivial
problem.5.
MA-5b: The unknown and unpredictable problems as-
sociated with deploying DNNs in a safety-critical open-
world context can only be identified by chance. For this
5Even though synthetic data may look “realistic” to a human, the
data-level distribution may be significantly different leading to non-
meaningful test results.
purpose, field test data need to be collected randomly in
accordance to the guidelines mentioned in MA-1.
Such a testing mainly addresses SC-4, but also supports
the mitigation of SC-6, by providing a means for finding
previously unknown safety-critical situations6. Note
that the open-context nature of the operational domain,
renders the coverage of the entire problem space via
brute-force approaches practically infeasible. Instead,
one needs to combine field testing with other methods,
as pointed out in this paper, to enable the release of such
systems.
Deep analysis of test results obtained in an iterative
development process (MA-6). As is known, DL is
a data-driven approach and its development should be
pursued in an iterative way. Discovered weaknesses
of the DL component are continuously mitigated by
optimizing architectures and hyperparameters or by
adding new data that covers previously missing aspects.
Hence, a fundamental part of this process is analyzing
the intermediate results, ideally leading to a continuous
improvement. In order to extract as much information
as possible from these results, the analysis should be
performed in a structured, careful, and if possible, auto-
mated manner (e.g., by extracting systematic weaknesses
from comprehensive metadata by which the data should
be enriched beforehand). In addition to cases where
the DL component makes wrong predictions, cases
associated with high uncertainty should be considered.
This is important because even though the function
might have been correct “at random”, it could lead to
wrong predictions and therefore, cannot be ignored. This
approach can contribute to the mitigation of SC-4 and
SC-6.
Data partitioning guidelines (MA-7) In order to
address SC-7 and estimate a DNN’s performance cor-
rectly, guidelines regarding partitioning the data into
training, validation and test datasets are necessary. In
particular, test data must not be correlated with training
data since otherwise the generalization capability of
the ML algorithm will be overestimated. This means
that, e.g., consecutive frames of a video sequence may
6It is important to note that for reasons described in SC-7, the test
set used for the ultimate performance evaluation needs to remain unseen
until final testing.
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Table 1: Overview of safety concerns and associated mitigation approaches.
Safety concern Mitigation approaches
Data distribution is not a good approxi-
mation of real world (SC-1)
Well-justified data acquisition strategy (MA-1), enabling the output of
reliable confidence information (MA-2), testing (MA-5), deep analysis
of test results obtained in an iterative development process (MA-6),
labeling guidelines (MA-8)
Distributional shift over time (SC-2) Enabling the output of reliable confidence information (MA-2), contin-
uous learning and updating (MA-10)
Incomprehensible behavior (SC-3) Using gray-box methods (MA-3)
Unknown behavior in rare critical situa-
tions (SC-4)
Well-justified data acquisition strategy (MA-1), enabling the output of
reliable confidence information (MA-2), testing (MA-5), deep analysis
of test results obtained in an iterative development process (MA-6),
continuous learning and updating (MA-10)
Unreliable confidence information
(SC-5)
Enabling the output of reliable confidence information (MA-2), using
gray-box methods (MA-3), testing (MA-5)
Brittleness of DNNs (SC-6) Enabling the output of reliable confidence information (MA-2), specifi-
cation of adversarial threat models and incorporation of defense meth-
ods (MA-4), testing (MA-5), deep analysis of test results obtained in
an iterative development process (MA-6), continuous learning and up-
dating (MA-10)
Inadequate separation of test and training
data (SC-7)
Data partitioning guidelines (MA-7)
Dependence on labeling quality (SC-8) Labeling guidelines (MA-8)
Insufficient consideration of safety in
metrics (SC-9)
Evaluating performance with respect to safety (MA-9)
not be assigned to different partitions. Further mea-
sures could be that test data needs to be acquired at
different days and locations as training data. Such guide-
lines need to be well-justified and the partitioning needs
to be subsequently reviewed with regard to the guidelines.
Labeling guidelines (MA-8) The dependence of
supervised learning methods on well-labeled data (see
SC-8 in section 4) requires strict labeling guidelines
and checks. The guidelines should be defined with
respect to the specific task (e.g. semantic segmentation
or object detection) and should ideally contain additional
application-specific annotations in order to enable an
automated evaluation, e.g., of the relative frequencies of
ODD factors such as weather conditions, object-specific
metadata, etc. Guidelines compilation has to be justified
and the adherence to them needs to be reviewed. Appro-
priately performed, this mitigates SC-8 and supports the
argumentation with respect to SC-1.
Evaluating performance with respect to safety
(MA-9). As pointed out above, current state-of-the-art
performance metrics in machine learning are calculating
average values not considering safety with respect to a
certain function (e.g., automated emergency brake) SC-9.
Realizing that it will not be possible to reach 100%
performance, it is obvious that a safety argumentation is
hardly possible based on these metrics. However, con-
sidering an object detection component in the perception
of an AD vehicle, it is actually not necessary to assure
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that all objects are detected but all the objects which
are relevant with respect to system safety. Additionally,
one could further refine that all relevant objects need to
be detected or a low confidence value needs to indicate
that the DNN might be wrong such that the system can
manage the situation safely (e.g., by relying more on
other information paths). Another important aspect is
the analysis of errors over time. If one considers, for
example, an object detection network, missing an object
in one single frame might not be problematic at all
because this can be compensated, e.g., by state-of-the-art
object tracking methods or by plausibility checks (e.g.,
a pedestrian will probably not disappear within a few
milliseconds). But if an object is not detected in several
consecutive frames, the severity of the error is much
higher. Therefore, tailored evaluation metrics are neces-
sary in order to meaningfully assess DNNs from a safety
perspective.
Continuous learning and updating (MA-10) In
order to maintain the safety of a DNN-based component,
the open context and distributional shift over time
problems (issued in SC-4 and in SC-2 respectively)
need to be addressed in the product’s life cycle. In
particular, the DNN could face novel inputs in which the
parameter distribution (e.g. pixel values in an image)
differ from that of the data seen during development.
This can occur either because the difference oversteps
the generalization abilities of the network (long-tailed
open context) or the input includes something completely
new (e.g. a new type of vehicle) which has not existed
before (temporal distributional shift) possibly leading to
hazards. Therefore, it may be necessary to continually
develop the algorithm further and updating it. Note that
continuous learning does not necessarily mean online
learning of the DNN already applied in the vehicle.
While this approach is generally possible, it comes with
its own specific problems, namely continuous validation
of the newly learned model in the car with only minimal
computation power as well as weak to no supervision.
Continuous learning as proposed here includes an offline
development step. New and useful data is recognized
by a DNN or some other mechanism and send back to
an offline data center where a new version of the DNN
is trained and validated. Finally, the old DNN in the
ADAS or AD vehicle is replaced with the new one, either
through software-over-the-air solutions or in a workshop.
This process ensures the in-use DNN to be up-to-date
while still having the ability to make use of large scale
computation power for validation.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we have presented a concise list of safety
concerns regarding deep learning methods used in percep-
tion pipelines of autonomous agents, especially highly au-
tomated vehicles. We also presented an extensive discus-
sion on possible mitigation approaches addressing those
safety concerns (the mapping is presented in table 1). It is
important to note that the discussed approaches have very
different maturity and complexity. Furthermore, while
all of the approaches can definitely contribute to a safety
case, for the time being it remains an open question when
a specific safety concern is sufficiently mitigated. In par-
ticular, many of the mitigation methods involve parame-
ters for which there does not exist a single correct value.
For example, some methods supply a key performance in-
dicator (KPI) telling the user how well the deep learning
algorithm under test performed with respect to this KPI.
However, the threshold for this KPI used to determine
whether the deep learning algorithm is safe cannot be ob-
tained analytically in many cases. Thus, it is essential to
collect knowledge and consolidate this in standardization
activities in order to define suitable processes, practices
and thresholds.
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